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Stability and Growth Pact II? Let’s Move 








After the fuzziness in Europe that surrounded the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure foreseen by the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), the European Union had to restore the credibility of the 
weakened fiscal rule. On March 2005, the 25 members amended the 
SGP. The constraint was to keep alive the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which instituted the SGP. Indeed, an attempt to make major changes 
to the SGP would have necessitated a new Treaty, and hence a rati-
fication by the 25 countries. This could have meant no more 
Europe-wide fiscal rule. But are minor changes enough? This paper 
addresses this question by deciphering the amended version of the 
SGP, and finds that, in the case countries still breach the SGP, an-
other minor change is possible: an “à la carte” version of the SGP. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
On March 20, 2005, Europe amended the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). The Stability and Growth Pact is the concrete EU answer to 
concerns on the continuation of budgetary discipline in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU). Adopted in 1997, the SGP 
strengthened the Treaty provisions on fiscal discipline in EMU 
foreseen by articles 99  and 104, with the full provisions taking ef-
fect when the Euro was launched on 1 January 1999. 
 
Under these circumstances, the big constraint was to adapt the rule 
without renegotiating the treaty of Amsterdam. Indeed, this would 
have required every country among the 25 members to agree upon 
the new rule. This practical constraint rendered impossible a change 
in the 3% of GDP deficit limit and 60% of GDP debt limit. How 
can we reform a rule in order to keep what is good in the SGP, in-
corporate criticisms from the economic literature, and introduce 
flexibility while the main two criteria cannot be changed? In the 
spring of 2005, this is the contortion European policymakers tried to 4    
   
make. The conclusion of this paper is that the curse of the first de-
sign of the SGP is still there. The author proposes a rule that is still 
in the spirit of the Treaty of Amsterdam, while conforming to the 
prerogatives laid out by the economic literature. To ease reading, 
SGP I is employed to describe the original version of the Pact, SGP 
II is related to the 2005 amended version (Warin, 2005), and SGP 
III is a potential rule based upon the provocative bet that countries 
will not abide by the SGP II; hence the European Union will have to 
find a new reading of the Treaty of Amsterdam if the EU does not 
want to revoke it. 
 
 
2.  Economic rationales of the SGP 
 
Several articles appeared in the immediate aftermath of the imple-
mentation of the SGP. Authors such as Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1998), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Bolt (1999), or Buti and van den 
Noord (2003, 2004) analyzed different elements of the Pact includ-
ing pros and cons of its implementation, and its effects on discre-
tionary fiscal policy and elections.   5 
 
The question of fiscal sustainability 
 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) find that the most compelling ra-
tionale for the SGP rests in the need to strengthen the no-bail-out 
rule and the budgetary surveillance guidelines. The SGP is impor-
tant since it can prevent debt accumulation from becoming unsus-
tainable. By implementing the SGP, member countries would re-
ceive early warning signals of an economic downturn before such a 
situation appears. However, the authors conclude that in most other 
situations the enforcement of the pact will be relatively loose. They 
hypothesize that both EU officials and member states will be reluc-
tant to levy deposits, and to impose fines. In 2005, the European 
Union decided not to fine Germany and France although they 
breached the deficit ceiling for three years in a row. Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1998) conclude that the SGP is a “minor nuisance” if 
countries have balanced or surplus budgets. However, if a country 
has a 3% deficit from the start, the SGP becomes an issue, because 
abiding by the 3% level depends heavily on external factors that can 
positively affect the GDP growth rate. 6    
   
 
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) study how national fiscal policies 
relate with a common monetary policy. They suggest a model of a 
monetary union where the price level is uniform across the union, 
labor is immobile internationally, and there is a single commodity 
which is perfectly substitutable and perfectly tradable. Under these 
assumptions, the authors test the effects of decentralized policymak-
ing when facing asymmetric shocks. They conclude that because the 
monetary policy is less likely to be used, fiscal policy is the only 
remaining device to ease the economic burden. However, they ex-
trapolate that if a country always resorts to using fiscal policies, 
their situation could become unsustainable and other countries 
might be forced to take informal action to bail out an insolvent na-
tional government. As a result, this literature finds a clear need to 
strengthen the no-bail-out policy outlined by the Treaty of Maas-
tricht. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) took another perspective on the 
importance and consequences of the SGP. 
 
The question of policy-mix 
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Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) build a model of “centralized monetary 
policymaking and decentralized fiscal policymaking by govern-
ments which are myopic because they can be voted out of office.” 
Using this approach, the authors investigate several different sce-
narios with and without the presence of the SGP. They find that a 
monetary union combined with an appropriately designed fiscal rule 
will be strictly preferred to fiscal autonomy. 
 
In his paper, Bolt (1999) focuses on the role of debt and the effects 
of fiscal spillovers on a union-wide inflation. The author simulates 
different scenarios of fiscal and monetary policy mixes, and con-
cludes that inflationary pressures increase as the impact of fiscal 
spillovers on the interest rates become greater. In this situation, the 
presence of the fiscal restraints would be beneficial.  
 
The political budget cycle approach 
 
Another important piece of the SGP literature focuses on the effects 
of elections on fiscal policy. Buti and van den Noord (2003) exam-
ine the fragile mechanisms in place to prevent politically motivated 8    
   
fiscal policies. They explain that the SGP “does not tackle a typical 
failure of fiscal policy behavior in Europe, namely the tendency to 
run expansionary pro-cyclical policies in good times.” Donahue and 
Warin (2006) confirm that the SGP is not a good device to prevent 
national elections from interfering with the European fiscal rule. 
 
 
3.  “Debt and deficit”, or “debt or deficit”? Alternative rules 
to the SGP 
 
 
In the early twenty-first century, the two major proponents of the 
SGP breached the SGP. Germany and France were not fined and 
this led to the collapse of the credibility of the SGP. The economic 
literature had an opportunity to propose several alternatives. Ac-
cording to Buti, et al. (2003), these alternative proposals can be di-
vided into four main categories: first, reform of the national institu-
tions and budgetary procedures; second, factor in the “quality” of 
public finances; third, focus on debt and sustainability; and fourth, 
fiscal policy coordination at the Euro area level.   9 
 
The reform of national institutions 
 
Two distinct reform packages have been suggested: first, procedural 
reforms; and second, institutional reforms. The former focuses on 
changing budgetary procedures through the implementation of dif-
ferent rules for the presentation, adoption, and execution of the gov-
ernment budgets. The latter focuses on retrenching existing institu-
tions or creating independent Fiscal Policy Committees (FPC) 
within each country. 
 
Authors such as Wyplosz (2005), Beetsma and Debrun (2005), 
Annet, et al. (2005), and Marinheiro (2005) argue for the strong 
version of institutional reform, the creation of an independent FPC, 
and a reconfiguring of the debt targets so that they are established 
country by country on a basis of the starting position.  
 10    
   
The “quality” of pubic finances 
 
There are two distinctive reform choices discussed in the literature 
about the quality of public finances: first, an expenditure target; and 
second, the golden rule of deficit financing. The first choice focuses 
on how expenditure rules can link the annual budgetary process to a 
multi-annual policy framework (Buti, et al., 2003). Brunila (2002) 
argue for expenditure targets for central governments, and balanced 
budget requirements for local governments. In contrast, the golden 
rule allows for the spreading of capital projects over several differ-
ent generations of taxpayers. This golden rule provides an answer to 
the criticisms of maintaining close to balance or surplus budget po-
sitions, because capital expenditures would not necessarily have to 
come out of the current revenues (Buti, et al., 2003; Fatas, 2005). 
 
Debt and sustainability 
 
For historical reasons, the SGP focuses mainly on deficits. Indeed, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam passed in 1997 is an extension of the fis-
cal criteria of the Treaty of Maastricht implemented in 1993. In  11 
1998, some countries failed to qualify the debt criterion. Since then, 
the debt has been interpreted in trend and not in level. Proposals 
provide an opportunity to overcome the homogeneity of the pact by 
providing more emphasis on public debt (Buti, et al., 2003). A re-
form could be to make the deficit ceiling dependent on the stock of 
debt. De Grauwe (2003) argues that countries should be able to 
choose their own debt targets, and as a consequence would have dif-
ferent deficit targets. Another method to make debt an important 
part of the SGP would consist of a choice for countries to opt-out of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure based on the deficit to abide by a 
the debt criterion only (Pisani-Ferry, 2002) or a Debt-Sensitive Sta-
bility Pact (DSSP) (Saraceno and Montperrus-Veroni, 2004). 
 
Fiscal policy coordination 
 
In this branch of the literature, proposals are twofold: first, to define 
an aggregate budget balance target; and second, to implement a 
tradable deficit permit mechanism. The rationale of the first pro-
posal is that the 3% GDP criterion would apply only to the average 
deficit in the Euro area and not to individual members (Muscatelli, 12    
   
et al., 2003). That means certain member states could overshoot the 
targets as long as other states have deficits below that value. The 
second proposal is supported by Casella, et al. (1999), who suggest 
that there should be market mechanisms to allocate deficit permits.  
 
 
4.  The institutional design 
 
 
The loss of the exchange rate instrument in the EMU was said to 
imply a greater role for automatic fiscal stabilizers to help econo-
mies adjust to asymmetric shocks, and make it “necessary to ensure 
that national budgetary policies support stability oriented monetary 
policies.” This is the rationale behind the SGP, i.e. to set the “ [me-
dium-term] objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in 
surplus…” which “[will] allow all Member States to deal with nor-
mal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government deficit 
within the reference value of 3% of GDP.” (Regulation 1466/97). 
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The SGP I 
 
Formally, the SGP I consisted of three elements defined as follows: 
 
•  a political commitment by all parties involved in the SGP 
(Commission, Member States, Council) to the full and timely 
implementation of the budget surveillance process. These are 
contained in a resolution agreed upon by the Amsterdam 
European Council of 17 June 1997. This political commit-
ment ensures that effective peer pressure is exerted on a 
Member State failing to live up to its commitments; 
 
•  preventive elements which, through regular surveillance, aim 
at preventing budget deficits going above the 3% reference 
value. To this end, Council Regulation 1466/97 reinforces the 
multilateral surveillance of budget positions and the co-
ordination of economic policies. The regulation foresees the 
possibility of triggering the early warning mechanism in the 
event a significant slippage in the budgetary position of  a 
Member State is identified. Part of this preventive component 14    
   
is the definition of the medium-term objective and its distinc-
tion from the reference value. The medium-term objective of 
budgetary positions should be close to balance or in surplus in 
order to allow Member States to deal with normal cyclical 
fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the 
3 % of GDP reference value; 
 
•  dissuasive elements, which in the event of the 3% reference 
value being breached, require Member States to take immedi-
ate corrective action and, if necessary, allow for the imposi-
tion of sanctions. These elements are contained in Council 
Regulation 1467/97 on the speeding up and clarifying of the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. 
 
The SGP II 
 
The SGP II does not exist formally, it is just an amended version of 
the SGP I. Changes are twofold and concern both the preventive 
and dissuasive arms of the Pact. First, it is about the new definition  15 
of the medium-term objective (preventive arm). Second, it is about 
exceptional circumstances (dissuasive arm). 
 
First, the medium-term objective definition is refined: prior to the 
change, Member States had to adhere to the medium-term objective 
for their budgetary positions of ‘close to balance or in surplus,’ In 
light of the economic and budgetary heterogeneity in the Union, the 
medium-term budgetary objective is now country-specific and its 
level should leave enough room for the country to adjust to any 
normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the government below 
the 3% of GDP reference value. The rationale of this change was to 
take into account the diversity of economic and budgetary positions 
and developments, as well as fiscal risks to the sustainability of 
public finances in the face of prospective demographic changes. 
 
This amendment may have interesting results. Indeed, the medium-
term objective in the SGP I was ignored by the countries, which 
considered only the 3% of GDP reference value. Its new definition 
based on country specificities is now at the core of the assessment 
of countries’ fiscal policies. In other words, it seems that for na-16    
   
tional policies, what matters is no longer 3%, but their specific  me-
dium-term objective, by definition lower than 3%. In this regard, 
the new preventive arm seems to be tighter than the original SGP. 
However, the European Union relaxed the pressure a bit. Indeed, if 
countries do not abide by the medium-term objective, this is accept-
able as long as they do not go over the reference value of 3%: regu-
lation 1466/97  explains “[in] order to enhance the growth-oriented 
nature of the Pact, major structural reforms which have direct long-
term cost-saving effects, including by raising potential growth, and 
therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of pub-
lic finances, should be taken into account when defining the ad-
justment path to the medium-term budgetary objective for countries 
that have not yet reached this objective and in allowing a temporary 
deviation from this objective for countries that have already reached 
it.” This excerpt from the amended regulation is sometimes misun-
derstood as a way to relax the reference value, when in fact it is a 
way to relax the constraint imposed by the medium-term objective. 
The amendment adds: “in order not to hamper structural reforms 
that unequivocally improve the long-term sustainability of public 
finances, special attention should be paid to pension reforms intro- 17 
ducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded 
pillar, because these reforms entail a short-term deterioration of 
public finances during the implementation period.” 
 
Second, the dissuasive arm is now looser than it was. The European 
Commission is asked to prepare a report in case of a breach of the 
deficit reference value. In case the breach is not justified by an eco-
nomic downturn (a recession of at least 2% of GDP), or an excep-
tional external event, countries have to make deposits to the Euro-
pean Commission that will be transformed into fines the third year, 
if a country could not abide by the reference value for three years in 
a row. The amended regulation loosens the constraint by introduc-
ing the notion of relevant factors: “[the] Commission, when prepar-
ing a report… shall take into account all relevant factors….” More-
over, before asking for deposits when a country breaches the deficit 
reference value for the first or second time, the Commission should 
look first at medium term economic position of a country, second at 
relevant factors, and third at the overall quality of public finances. 
First, the medium term economic position of a country should be 
scrutinized and “[in] particular potential growth, prevailing cyclical 18    
   
conditions, the implementation of policies in the context of the Lis-
bon agenda and policies to foster research and development and in-
novation.” Second, the amended version lists the relevant factors: 
budgetary efforts towards increasing, or maintaining at a high level, 
financial contributions to foster international solidarity and achieve 
European policy goals. A goal of note is the unification of Europe, 
which may have a detrimental effect on the growth and fiscal bur-
den of a Member State. Third, qualitative factors should be consid-
ered, such as fiscal consolidation efforts in “good times,” and a high 
overall quality of public finances: debt sustainability (meaning be-
low 60%), and a big share of the deficit going to public investment 
(a reference to the golden rule). 
 
This loosening of the dissuasive arm is intended to prevent coun-
tries from having to make a deposit the year they breach the deficit 
reference value, and thus, keep them away from the “three years in 
a row” rule. It is likely that no country will have to pay fines, since 
it is very difficult to be three years in a row over the reference value 
without being excused. This is not a real worry. First if a country is 
excused, it seems to be for good reasons. Second, through the pre- 19 
ventive arm of the SGP, the Commission will put more pressure 
than under the SGP I. However, the interesting question will be 
whether the preventive arm – tighter than under the SGP I – will 
outweigh the loosening of the dissuasive arm? The answer is in the 
hands of national governments. 
 
The SGP III: “À la carte” 
 
Can we trust national governments? The evidence from the SGP I is 
“yes” for most of them, but “no” for some others. Ironically the 
“no” answer is for the two proponents of the SGP, Germany and 
France. It is, thus, tough to answer the question of whether the pre-
ventive arm will be stronger than the dissuasive arm. In case coun-
tries breach the SGP and again erode its credibility, there are still  
many ways to slightly change the interpretation of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam without having to ratifying a new Treaty with a new fis-
cal rule. 
 
Saraceno and Montperrus-Veroni (2004) propose the DSSP, and 
Pisani-Ferry (2002) a debt based criterion. Let us go a little farther: 20    
   
pick your own menu. This is, in a way, what was proposed by the 
economic literature calling for more flexibility: one size does not fit 
all when it comes to the fiscal policy, especially when an economic 
zone already has a common monetary policy. More precisely, as 
long as a country has a public debt lower than 60% of GDP, it 
would be allowed to run any level of public deficit. It is one way to 
reward countries with a sustainable debt level, as officially defined 
by the Treaty of Maastricht. Hence, the “well-behaved” country in 
need of a fiscal answer to a sluggish economy can use fiscal policy. 
On the other side, if a country is already over the 60% ceiling, then 
the 3% rule for the deficit should be strictly implemented. The 
country who had already abused its fiscal policy will have to work 
on its public finances to make them sustainable. This country would 
eventually have a debt level below 60%. This would be another 
reading of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This SGP III is, in a way, al-
ready embedded into the SGP II, except the amended version does 
not go this far: “developments in the medium-term budgetary posi-
tion [should be considered] (in particular, fiscal consolidation ef-
forts in “good times”, debt sustainability, public investment and the 
overall quality of public finances).” Here, the European Union asks  21 
the Commission, when writing its report on a country who breached 
the deficit reference value, to consider whether the country has a 
sound public debt, or has made some efforts in “good times” at low-
ering the deficit. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
 
In retrospect, countries will decide the fate of the SGP II. It is, thus, 
too early to know whether the new preventive arm—tighter than 
under SGP I—will outweigh the new dissuasive arm—looser than 
under the SGP I. In case the SGP II falls into the traps of its prede-
cessor, the European Union could use the “À la carte” approach: the 
SGP stays the same in terms of reference values, 3% and 60% re-
spectively for the public deficit and the public debt. Instead of only 
looking at the deficit for practical reasons, the new reading of the 
SGP would help define easy, and coercive criteria. This interpreta-
tion would be more consistent with the idea of sustainability since, 
now, it would be measured through the lens of the debt instead of 22    
   
the deficit. After all, the emphasis on deficit versus the debt was a 
natural reaction to the fact that after the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, some countries (Italy, Belgium, and Greece) were way 
over the 60% limit. 
 
With this “À la carte” approach, all the countries would eventually 
have a debt lower than 60% of GDP, and a deficit lower than 3% of 
GDP, exactly what was intended in 1993 with the Treaty of Maas-







Annet, A., Decressin, J., and Deppler, M., 2005. Reforming the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact. IMF Policy Discussion Paper. 
 
Beetsma, R., and Bovenberg, A. L., 1995. The Interaction of Fiscal 
and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Balancing Credibility  23 
and Flexibility. Working Papers Tilburg Center for Economic Re-
search. 
 
Beetsma, R., and Debrun, X., 2005. Implementing the Stability and 
Growth Pact: Enforcement and Procedural Flexibility. Working Pa-
per Series, European Central Bank 433, 1-34. 
 
Beetsma, R., and Uhlig, H., 1999. An Analysis of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Economic Journal, 546-571. 
 
Bolt, W., 1999. Fiscal Restraints, ECB Credibility, and the Stability 
Pact: A Game-Theoretic Approach. DNB Staff Reports. 
 
Brunila, A., 2002. Fiscal Policy: Coordination, Discipline and Sta-
bilization, Group of Economic Analysis for the European Commis-
sion, Brussels. 
 
Buti, M., Eijffinger, S., and Franco, D., 2003. Revisiting the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment". Eco-
nomic Papers (European Commission) 180. 24    
   
 
Buti, M., and van den Noord, P., 2003. Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
and Elections: The Experience of the Early Years of EMU. OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper 351. 
 
Buti, M., and Van den Noord, P., 2004. Fiscal Policy in EMU: 
Rules, Discretion and Political Incentives. Economic Papers 04, 1-
42. 
 
Casella, A., Lockwood, B., and Birch Sorensen, P., 1999. Tradable 
Deficit Permits: Efficient Implementation of the Stability Pact in the 
European Monetary Union. Economic Policy 14, 321-361. 
 
De Grauwe, P., 2003. Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford. 
 
Donahue, K., and Warin, T., 2006. The Stability and Growth Pact: 
A European Answer to the Political Budget Cycle? Middlebury 
College Working Paper Series 06, 1-24. 
  25 
Eichengreen, B., and Wyplosz, C., 1998. The Stability Pact: More 
than a Minor Nuisance. Economic Policy, 67-113. 
 
Fatas, A., 2005. Is There a Case for Sophisticated Balanced-Budget 
Rules? OECD Economics Department Working Papers 466, 1-21. 
 
Marinheiro, C., 2005. Has the Stability and Growth Pact Stabilized? 
Evidence from a Panel of 12 European Countries and Some Impli-
cations for the Reform of the Pact. CESifo Working Paper series 
1411, 1-16. 
 
Muscatelli, V. A., Natale, P., and Tirelli, P., 2003. A Simple and 
Flexible Alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact Deficit Ceil-
ings. Is it at Hand? CESifo Working Paper. 
 
Pisani-Ferry, J., 2002. Fiscal Discipline and Policy Coordination in 
the Eurozone: Assessment and Proposals. European Commission 
President's Group of Economic Analysis. 
 26    
   
Saraceno, F., and Montperrus-Veroni, P., 2004. A Simple Proposal 
for a "Debt-Sensitive Stability Pact". OFCE Working Paper Series, 
1-11. 
 
Warin, T., 2005. Fiscal Perspectives in Europe: Convergence and 
Debt's Burden. Minda de Gunzburg Working Papers Series, 1-14. 
 
Wyplosz, C., 2005. Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules. Na-
tional Institute Economic Review 191, 64-67. 
 